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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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AD 873232

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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (12 Aug 70) FOR OT UT 702269 18 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th
Psychological Operations Battalion, Period Ending 30 April
1970

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Information of actions initiated as a result of subject report should be forwarded to ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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as

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 7TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96349

AVGM-7C

11 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Psychological
Operations Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

THRU: Commanding General
XXIV Corps
ATTN: G5
APO 96349

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
TC: Commanding Officer
4th Psychological Operations Group
ATTN: AVGM-C
APO 96227

1. REFERENCES:

- a. USARV Regulation 525-15, subject as above, April 1968.
- b. 4th PSYOP Group Reg 335-3, subject as above, December 1968.

2. Submitted herewith is the Quarterly Operational Report - Lessons Learned, for the period 1 February 1970 to 30 April 1970, prepared in accordance with the above references.

4 Incls
as


G. L. JACOBSON
LTC FA
Commanding

FOR OT UT
702269
Inclosure

11 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Psychological Operations Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

SECTION I OPERATIONS - SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1. During the reporting quarter, the 7th PSYOP Battalion engaged in 26 hours of mandatory training, including weapons familiarization and CBR refresher training administered to newly assigned personnel as part of the replacement training program. In addition, each new arrival was briefed on the unit's organization, mission, and capabilities, and its PSYOP support role in the I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ). In 89 days of continuous operations the battalion produced 77,297,737 6" x 3" leaflet equivalents. The number of requests for development and printing support fluctuated from a low of 55 in February to a high of 113 in March. The small number of requests for local development and printing support received during February is attributed to the large volume of off-shore printed materials disseminated in support of the TET campaign during that period. An increase in rallier appeal leaflet requests and in the number of items developed in support of the Phoenix/Phung Hoang Program accounted for the increased support rendered by the battalion in March.

2. Enemy activity continued at a low level during most of the reporting period. A slight increase in enemy activity was experienced during the TET season but a major enemy offensive did not develop. Enemy activity then dropped to the low level experienced during the end of 1969 and remained at that level until the beginning of April when attacks by fire and terrorist activity in populated areas increased. The increase continued through the first 15 days of April when it again declined to a low rate for the remainder of the quarter.

3. On 9 March, the 7th PSYOP Battalion was placed under operational control of XXIV Corps after the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) relinquished control of US forces in the ICTZ. There were no significant changes in battalion operations.

4. Support of the TET-1970 Campaign, which began in September 1969, was concluded on 20 February 1970. The campaign had as its broad objective the inducement of the maximum number of VC/NVA ralliers.

5. The campaign was conducted in three phases:

a. During the planning phase (1 September - 31 October 1969) the 7th PSYOP Battalion reviewed after-action reports from previous TET campaigns and planned for development and printing of locally produced PSYOP

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materials. Additionally, advice was provided to the III MAF PSYOP Officer on the quantity, target audiences, and themes that should be included in the off-shore printed material that would be provided by MACV.

b. During the preparation phase (1 November - 31 December 1969) the TET counter-offensive Campaign conducted in 1969 was reviewed and those materials that could be updated and re-used were identified. The PSYOP officers of all supported units and the field detachment commanders were briefed on the scope of the campaign and were offered an opportunity to bring up problem areas experienced during previous TET campaigns. Copies of TET stationery (4-81-69) and locally developed stationery were distributed with instructions on preparation of traditional TET letters. Other materials in support of this campaign were also developed and stocked, and limited quantities of off-shore produced TET materials were received for dissemination during the execution phase.

c. The execution phase was originally scheduled to last from 1 January to 31 March 1970. However, this unit's support of actual TET activities was concluded on 20 February. During the execution phase, the remaining off-shore and Saigon-produced materials were received and disseminated. Special TET tapes for air and ground broadcast were distributed to supported units and field teams. The dissemination of TET leaflets and broadcast of TET tapes commenced on 16 January and was completed on 20 February. During this period, 89 million leaflets were disseminated and 144 hours of aerial broadcasts were conducted.

d. A detailed after-action report of TET activities was prepared and forwarded to 4th PSYOP Group on 24 February.

6. In April the Joint Propaganda Development Center was redesignated the Combined Propaganda Development Section (CPDS).

7. The 7th Battalion's Propaganda Development Section greatly increased its propaganda testing activities during this past quarter. Testing is now being conducted at local Chieu Hoi Centers, several POW holding areas, and in rural hamlets. An office has been established by the Testing and Evaluation Section of PDS at the I Corps Regional Chieu Hoi Center in Da-nang, to assure ready access to Hoi Chanhs for use in testing and evaluation of propaganda items.

8. During this reporting period, the 7th Battalion supported the Phoenix/Phung Hoang Program in its campaign to induce the local populace to report

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the location of VCI through the use of "wanted" posters. The colored border on the standard poster design provided by 4th PSYOP Group, using the Vietnamese national colors to frame the photograph of the wanted VCI, was not used. It was determined after careful evaluation that many persons in rural areas, especially those who are illiterate, would recognize the national colors and gain the initial impression that the person pictured is a GVN official or that he represents the GVN. Posters with a colored border were used only in the production of general advertisements which called on the people to provide information on VCI. In one reported case, one of the posters led to the capture of a wanted criminal within 24 hours after it was posted. Attached as inclosure #1 is an example of the new style wanted poster produced by the 7th Battalion.

9. The Battalion provided PSYOP support to the 101st Airborne Division in its campaign to induce more VC ralliers through the use of personalized letters. Under this program, personnel of the Division PSYOP Section and provincial advisory teams gathered family photos of known Viet Cong operating in the area. The families were then asked to prepare personalized messages to their VC relatives. The message, together with the family photo, was then printed on leaflets and dropped in areas where VC were known to be operating. During the reporting period, items were developed in support of this campaign. Catalog sheets of two of these items are attached as inclosure #2.

10. During this quarter the Battalion's field detachments, with the support of two photographers from 4th Group, took photos for slide shows of their respective areas of operation. Photographs were taken of local GVN officials, province capitals, government programs and military efforts. When the processed slides are received from 4th Group, written scripts will be arranged to produce locally oriented slide shows, for use by audio-visual field teams. The itinerary of suggested subjects attached as inclosure #3 was provided to the detachments by the 7th Battalion CPDS.

11. During February, ARVN forces of the Quang Da Special Zone scored a significant victory over three Communist battalions in "Operation Dueng Son," in which more than 200 NVA and VC main force soldiers were killed. Both the ARVN and the US 1st Marine Division expressed interest in exploiting this incident with Pro-GVN and Anti-VC/NVA propaganda. Recognizing the need to take maximum psychological advantage of ARVN, RF and PSDF capabilities, especially in view of the US troop replacement, the 7th Battalion developed propaganda items directed at both the local populace and VC/NVA units. These items stressed the theme of the enemy's declining tactical

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effectiveness and the ARVN's capability to defeat enemy forces. One of these items exemplifies the prowess of Quang Nam Regional Forces by relating a major victory they achieved in Dien Ban District and another explains to the local populace the advantages of establishing and utilizing People's Self Defense Forces to defend their hamlets from VC terrorism and sabotage. The data og sheet of the leaflet developed in support of this ARVN victory is attached as inclosure #4.

12. In response to a request from the Civil Affairs Team in Quang Nam District, Quang Tri Province, the 7th Battalion is developing a PSYOP campaign targeted toward the Bru Montagnard tribe. The campaign is designed to encourage health, sanitation and improved farming methods among the Bru.

13. G5 XXIV Corps has initiated development of a combined I Corps, XXIV Corps Chieu Hoi campaign plan. The 7th Battalion IDS reviewed the plan and forwarded recommended revisions to XXIV Corps. The plan outlines procedures for the conduct of psychological operations in support of the Chieu Hoi Program and provides guidance and direction to insure maximum, efficient utilization of US and GVN PSYOP/POLWAR resources. A copy of this plan will be forwarded to 4th PSYOP Group upon approval by I Corps and XXIV Corps.

14. The success of the Chieu Hoi Program in the ICTZ was demonstrated when 74 Viet Cong prisoners of war requested, and were accorded, Hoi Chanh status. A public ceremony in which the status of the former POWs was changed, was conducted on 26 March to coincide with the observance of the new national holiday for land reform. During the ceremony, which was attended by the Mayor of Danang and other high level civic officials, the new Hoi Chanh presented signed statements in which they declared that they were acting voluntarily and from motives of personal conviction.

15. On 4 March, an interrogator from the Battalion's Propaganda Development Section questioned two NVA officers (both Hoi Chanh) concerning the existence of a "Code of Conduct" for NVA prisoners of war. Both men asserted that there does exist a Code of Conduct for NVA soldiers which is based on party loyalty toward the Communist Party of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Lao Dong). The code is commonly reiterated in regular indoctrination periods, and is applicable to all soldiers including non-party members. Both officers also asserted that internal controls do exist among NVA prisoners, and that NVA soldiers are encouraged to lie to enemy interviewers to mislead them and to protect military information. Neither of the officers interviewed had ever received any instruction on counterinterrogation techniques other than the directive that they should lie if forced to talk.

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The two officers were interrogated separately and had no opportunity to communicate with each other.

16. On 23 February 1970, LCDR Jampoler (MAC/J3-11) briefed representatives of the various PSYOP agencies in the ICTZ on a new PSYOP reporting system. The new system, which became effective 1 March, is called the Psychological Operations Information System (PSYOPSIS) and replaced the PSYOP Summary Reporting System which employed MACV Form 48. The new system is designed to provide simplified and streamlined input from the field to MAC/J3-11 where it is used in automated compilation, storage, and analysis of psychological operations on a country-wide basis. As a result of this simplified method of reporting, this unit has experienced a considerable reduction in the number of man-hours expended in the reporting of PSYOP activity.

17. A national holiday was declared to coincide with President Thieu's announcement of the new Land Reform Program on 26 March 1970. Leaflet drops and tape broadcasts announcing the new program and briefly outlining its intent were conducted throughout the ICTZ to coincide with the celebration. Leaflet and tape broadcast missions were flown by 110th Squadron (VNAF) with back-up support from "A" Flight, 9th Special Operations Squadron (9th SOS). Support by this unit was limited to coordinating the efforts of 110th Squadron and 9th SOS.

18. CPDS development for the period ending 30 April 1970 is as follows:

a. LEAFLETS:

Chieu Hoi	111
Pro-GVN	3
Rewards	8
Anti-NVA	32
Anti-VC/NVA	<u>13</u>
	167

b. HANDBILLS:

Pro-GVN	21
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Rewards	3
Anti-VC	<u>2</u>
	26
c. POSTERS:	
Chieu Hoi	1
Pro-GVN	5
Rewards	12
Anti-VC/NVA	<u>36</u>
	54
d. NEWSPAPERS:	
Ban Tin	<u>10</u>
	10
e. TAPES:	
Chieu Hoi	25
Pro-GVN	2
Anti-NVA	5
Anti-VC/NVA	<u>5</u>
	37
f. MIXES:	
Rewards	1
Anti-NVA	<u>1</u>
	2
	6

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19. Reduction in the 7th PSYOP Battalion's troop strength by "stand-down" for Phase III Redeployment necessitated a reorganization of some staff sections. The S2 Section, whose functions had long overlapped with the Propaganda Development Section's analysis responsibilities, was combined with PDS into a single staff section. The S2's document registration and safeguarding functions are now performed by a single enlisted man (MOS 96B; E6) with staff responsibility belonging to one of PDS's officers as a secondary or additional duty. Intelligence acquisition and analysis activities are currently being reevaluated to determine which should be continued as essential to the Battalion's propaganda development effort. The XXIV Corps, which recently replaced III MAF as the US command element in the ICTZ, has assumed an increased role in supplying prepared intelligence to the 7th Battalion through its G5/PSYOP Intelligence Section.

20. During this reporting period, a partial suspension of all requisitions for equipment under the "G" series TO&E was announced. Since the activation of the "G" series in December 1969, a number of discrepancies have arisen concerning quantities and identification of certain line items of equipment. Until such time as these problems are cleared up, no further requisitioning action will be taken by this unit, with the exception of certain items that are considered essential, and are available from in-country resources.

21. In the area of PSYOP expendable support from our direct support unit (334th Supply and Service Co., 80th General Support Group), this unit has learned that QRR requisitions no longer have an interim processing step at Qui Nhon Support Depot, but pass directly from Danang to the Inventory Control Center (ICCV) at Long Binh. In the past, our experience has been that many of the PSYOP expendable requisitions are rejected at Qui Nhon, thereby confusing demand data at our Direct Support Unit (DSU) and restricting the percentage of fill on a number of items. To counteract this problem, the DSU instructed this Battalion to place all expendable requisitions on an O5 priority and if low stockage levels justify it, to use an O2 priority. Because Qui Nhon Depot is no longer in the "Chain," this unit will return to 12 priority requisitions for all expendables, except when low stockage levels would justify an O5 priority.

SECTION II COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Personnel: None.
2. Intelligence: None.

NOT REPRODUCIBLE

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3. Operations:

a. Methods of Testing Propaganda:

(1) OBSERVATION: When testing propaganda the use of non-standard questionnaires does not allow for quick and accurate tabulation of test results.

(2) EVALUATION: Due to the great volume of propaganda testing and evaluation done by the Testing and Evaluation Section of the Combined Propaganda Development Section, it is necessary to be able to rapidly compile the test results. These test results must then be tabulated quickly, correctly, and in an orderly fashion.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: When testing any large volume of propaganda a standard questionnaire should be used.

b. De-Americanization of Printed Propaganda Materials:

(1) OBSERVATION: Leaflets and other printed materials which appear to originate with US organizations lend credence to the Communist lie that the GVN is only a puppet of the US.

(2) EVALUATION: All printed propaganda material printed by this unit contains an identification/control number. When the figure "7" appears in the control number, or in any other part of the leaflet, it becomes evident to a target audience that the material was originated by a foreign source, since Vietnamese write this same figure as "7".

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That when the number "7" appears in printed propaganda materials, the Vietnamese version of this figure be used to eliminate any foreign imprint.

c. Repetition of familiar themes:

(1) OBSERVATION: Ground loudspeaker teams experience the problem that the continued broadcast of familiar themes often has a negative effect on the desired audience.

(2) EVALUATION: HE and HB teams that operate in the same AO each week often fail to attract or are unable to elicit enthusiastic response from the local populace. In an effort to correct this situation, the teams are making progress in gathering selections of popular music,

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tape recording these selections, and then reading short propaganda statements between the selections when they are broadcasting.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Tape recordings of popular music can serve as an "attention-getter" prior to the dissemination of psychological propaganda. Most of the people who live in small villages and hamlets have no radios, television, or newspapers. With the use of the loudspeaker system, combined with tape-recorded music to draw the crowd, PSYOP can have a much greater effect and appeal to the Vietnamese people.

d. Feedback:

(1) OBSERVATION: While broadcasting from the MSQ-85 it has been noticed that a considerable amount of feedback is inevitable if the tape recorder or speaker is placed in front of the speakers.

(2) EVALUATION: For the sake of comfort, especially during foul weather, audio-visual teams on ground loudspeaker missions attempt to broadcast from the covered cab portion of the truck. The proximity of the speakers directly over the cab creates feedback of an extremely distracting nature. An understanding of the characteristics of feedback dictates a simple solution to the problem.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Feedback can be eliminated by simply moving the microphone and broadcast source to the rear of the speaker system. In the case of the MSQ-85, broadcasting from the electrical shelter accomplishes this. If feedback should persist, shifting the microphone to the left or right may yield the desired effect.

e. Receipt of Off-Shore Leaflet Shipments:

(1) OBSERVATION: Eighteen million of a total of 88.9 million leaflets that this unit was scheduled to receive were mis sent and only through the efforts of the 4th PSYOP Group was the shipment located and the leaflets air-shipped to this unit in time to support the TET PSYOP campaign. Additionally, only 18% of the total leaflets was received by this unit prior to 1 January 1970.

(2) EVALUATION: The late receipt of leaflets from off-shore sources has been a problem for the last two TET campaigns. The short fall in shipments this year was not as significant as in previous years. For

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the first two weeks of the campaign, eighteen million leaflets were not available to support the campaign.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That all off-shore leaflets be scheduled to arrive on station one month prior to the starting date of the campaign. This procedure will allow for the location and transshipment of misrouted items. It will also allow a more orderly targeting and dissemination of the materials to the respective target audiences.

f. TET stationery:

(1) OBSERVATION: The TET stationery (4-81-69) that was printed off-shore contained the Chieu Hoi symbol, thus reducing its usefulness.

(2) EVALUATION: TET stationery is used by GVN officials to communicate TET greetings to the people. Although some of these letters do contain a Chieu Hoi appeal, many are directed to the local populace and stress such themes as the strength and prosperity of the GVN, pacification progress, etc. Such themes do not lend themselves to stationery which includes the Chieu Hoi symbol.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That, in the future, two types of stationery be developed, one with and one without the Chieu Hoi symbol.

g. Development of Recording Rooms at Detachment Levels:

(1) OBSERVATION: Locally oriented and developed PSYOP tapes have greatly supplemented the pacification effort, especially with regards to the HB Team employment.

(2) EVALUATION: By using a closet and sound proofing material, 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, has developed a recording room which produces quality tapes of a quick reaction nature. The facility was instrumental in developing recent tapes for use in the exploitation of ARVN victories at FB Anzio and FB Nancy. Its use has also been extended to dubbing music tapes and news broadcasts.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That field units receive sound proofing tile and, if necessary, building materials so that a recording area can be developed for locally initiated and oriented taped broadcasts.

h. Rallies and Country Fairs:

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(1) OBSERVATION: The use of rallies and country fairs to disseminate psychological materials is an efficient means of utilizing limited resources.

(2) EVALUATION: Effective use of popular psychological operations resources is the key to fulfilling pacification objectives when so few resources are available. The Pro-GVN Rally and Country Fair are two operations which increase the audience and make them more susceptible to indoctrination. Yet, these resources are effective largely in their ability to gather crowds and this may rely heavily upon the timing of the operation. While the rice harvest is being conducted, the farmers have little free time during the week. Sunday is perhaps the only day which is not spent in the fields and therefore makes it ideal for scheduling rallies and fairs.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That when possible, scheduling for rallies and fairs should coincide with a convenient Sunday so that maximum participation can be achieved.

i. Use of Ground PSYOP Teams:

(1) OBSERVATION: The use of ground PSYOP teams can be an effective means of deterring enemy probes and ground attacks.

(2) EVALUATION: The enemy is most effective when he operates with the element of surprise. The use of PSYOP ground broadcasts has been utilized to harass and confuse the enemy during the hours of probable movement, falsely giving the enemy the impression that we are aware of his movement. The use of funeral music, bugle fanfares and recorded messages with reverberating characteristics are several of the available techniques which have resulted in the desired effect. In one recorded incident, the location of the enemy was identified when he fired wildly at the broadcast scene.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Current tape libraries are not well-stocked with material suitable to use around a US base camp perimeter. Experimentation should be encouraged in order to develop the harassing and confusing sound which makes base defense PSYOP missions effective.

j. Inquisitive Children and Thieves:

(1) OBSERVATION: All audio-visual teams have a common problem

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which involves the control of inquisitive children and thieves.

(2) EVALUATION: Showing movies is not a small task for a two-man team and requires uninterrupted effort during vital periods of the presentation. Curious children and thieves have a tendency to disrupt the team and create a control problem, dangerous as well as annoying.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: The use of local defense forces (PF's, PSDF's, RD's) has proven to be an extremely effective means of crowd control. Constant surveillance and the use of chains and locks are the only remedies for thievery and looting found so far.

4. Organization: None.
5. Training: None.
6. Logistics: None.
7. Communications: None.
8. Material: None
9. Other: None.

AVII-GE (11 May 70) (101 Ind)
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned, 7th Psychological Operations Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65(R2)

TO: Headquarters, XXIV Corps, APO San Francisco 96349 20 May 1970

FROM: Commanding Officer, 4th Psychological Operations Group, ATTN:
AGC, APO 96227

After review of the subject report, this headquarters concurs with the comments and recommendations contained therein, and considers no additional comment necessary.

ADMINISTRATIVE COMMENTS



PAUL W. TRAXLER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

AVQM-C (25 May 1970) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned, 7th Psychological Operations
Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-7)

Department of the Army, HQ, 4th Psychological Operations Group, APO San
Francisco 96227 4 June 1970

TO: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST APO 96375

This headquarters concurs with the comments and recommendations contained
in the subject report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

MICHAEL V. TALLMAN
CPT, ADA
Adjutant

AVHGC-DST (11 May 70) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 7th Psychological Operations Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 23 JUN 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 7th Psychological Operations Battalion and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.


2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Indoctrination of NVA", page 4, paragraph 15. This item has been extracted for inclusion in the next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

b. Reference item concerning "Receipt of Off-Shore Leaflet Shipments", page 9, paragraph 3e: concur. Local commanders and 4th PSYOP Group will have to coordinate and program off-shore production requirements to ensure that scheduled in-country receipt dates are achieved. Unit has been so advised.

c. Reference item concerning "TET Stationary", page 10, paragraph 3f: concur. The request to print Chieu Hoi symbology on all items was required by MACV. Coordination is required between battalion and 4th Group propaganda development teams and MACV PSYOP personnel. This ORLL is being forward to MACV for information.

FOR THE COMMANDER


D. J. Winter
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
4th PSYOP Gp
7th PSYOP Bn

GPOP-DT (11 May 70) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 7th Psychological Operations Battalion
for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 10 JUL 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
D.D. CLINE
LUT, AGC
Asst AG

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CO, 7th Psychological Operations Battalion		
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